Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”), in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58– After his retirement in , Frege moved to Bad Kleinen, near Wismar, and managed to publish a number of important articles, “Der Gedanke” (“The Thought “.
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Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)
deg Note, however, rfege thinking would then count as purely logical whether or not the thoughts involved are ‘about’ anything specifically logical. Philosophy of Languagep. The number zero is then defined as the value-range consisting of all value-ranges the same size as the value-range of the concept being non-self-identical.
The final properties Frege discusses are the under- and over-determination of Thoughts by sentential content. Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 1: This further restriction seems necessary since Frege accepts that all sciences e.
Frege, Gottlob | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Clarendon CopiI. It is clear that functions are to be understood as the references of incomplete expressions, but what of the senses of such expressions?
It is from this that Frege came be to be a bit wider known, including to an Austrian student studying engineering in Manchester, England, named Ludwig Wittgenstein.
For one, the authors seem to take the purity of ‘pure or logical’ thinking to require that anything besides logical content be excluded from the mind altogether: Blackwell, third edition GeachP. He was forced to quickly prepare an appendix in response. In the late s and early s Frege developed new and interesting theories regarding the nature of language, functions and concepts, and philosophical logic, including a novel theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference.
Frege’s logical works were revolutionary, and are often taken to represent the fundamental break between contemporary approaches and the older, Aristotelian tradition.
Article Summary: “Der Gedanke” by Gottlob Frege | Analysis
See below for more on Frege’s understanding of concepts, functions and objects. Bad KleinenMecklenburg-SchwerinGermany.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Article PDF first page preview. Because the sense of a whole proposition is determined by the senses of the parts, and the reference of a whole proposition is determined by the parts, Frege claims that propositions in which such expressions appear are able to express thoughts, but are neither true nor false, because no references are determined for them.
Moreover, until Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica 3 vols. Thoughts are expressed by propositional questions which are not assertoric as well as interrogative sentences which are assertoricindicating that the assertion of a Thought is a separate issue from its truth value e. However, he continued to influence others during this period. Index of language articles.
What Garavaso and Vassallo never directly address, however, is a possibility so central to motivating Frege’s logicism in the first place — namely, that thinking is capable of much more than merely grasping thoughts. Frege had a heavy teaching load during gwdanke first few years at Jena.
Take care that nothing gets lost.
It is not clear how Frege himself could count as thinking any mental activity which not only does not successfully grasp a thought, but which vrege even aim at one. While the truth of an identity statement involves only the references of the component expressions, the informativity of such statements involves additionally the way in which those references are determined, i.
Gwdanke of the philosophical doctrines of the mature Frege have parallels in Lotze; it has been the subject of scholarly debate whether or not there was a direct influence on Frege’s views arising from his attending Lotze’s lectures. Mathematical truths are objective, not subjective. You are commenting using your Twitter account. This article has no associated abstract.
The sense of a complete proposition is what it is we understand when we understand a ded, which Frdge calls “a thought” Gedanke.
Blackwell BenacerrafP. Black in Black edrGeach and Black  pp. This too was impossible in all earlier logical systems. Typically, such cases involve what Frege calls “indirect speech” or ” oratio obliqua “, as in the case of statements of beliefs, geanke, desires and other so-called “propositional attitudes”, such as the examples of 5 and 6.
The sense of the name “Aristotle” is not the words “the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great”; to repeat, senses are not linguistic items. Conjunction and disjunction signs could then be defined from the negation and conditional signs. However, his work was interrupted by changes to his views. The first appears to be a trivial case of the law of self-identity, knowable a prioriwhile the second seems to be something that was discovered a posteriori by astronomers.
Names such as “Romulus” or “Odysseus”, and phrases such as “the least rapidly converging series” or “the present King of France” express senses, insofar as they lay out criteria that things would have to satisfy if they were to be the references of these expressions.
The Begriffsschrift broke new ground, including a rigorous treatment of the ideas of functions and variables. But Dummett himself was sharply critical of the more platonistic aspects he found in Frege’s doctrine of sense and thought, and the insufficient measure Frege took of the role that mental, cognitive, and communicative activity plays in shaping, and limiting, what sense, meaning, thought, and understanding could ever amount to, within human life.
Peter Geach, Blackwell, It should be kept in mind that Frege was employed as a mathematician, not a philosopher, and he published his philosophical papers in scholarly journals that often were hard to access outside of the German-speaking world.
However, it then becomes to difficult to explain why 2 seems informative while 1 does not.
His logicism was modest in one sense, but very ambitious in others. Views Read Edit View history. Such contexts can be frrge to as “oblique contexts”, contexts in which the reference of an expression is shifted from its customary reference to its customary sense.
Here we can see the connection with the understanding of number expressions as being statements about concepts.